I am a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Hamburg. I am also an Associate Member of Nuffield College (University of Oxford) and a CAGE Research Associate (University of Warwick). My research is in comparative political economy. I study preferences and decision-making. Central questions I am interested in are why some people support higher levels of redistribution than others and what role welfare state institutions and considerations of fairness play for redistribution preferences. My current research further examines the effect of variation in regional economic well-being on political preferences and anti-immigration attitudes.
Methodologically, I combine quantitative observational analyses with experimental approaches. The institutional dimensions I am interested in are difficult to study in isolation. I therefore draw from real-world variations and utilize laboratory and online experiments to study the underlying mechanisms in more controlled settings.
I am currently teaching seminars on topics in comparative political economy and on the politics of respresentation and economic inequality at the University of Hamburg. Previously, I have thought seminars in comparative political economy at the University of Mannheim.
PhD in Political Science, 2019
University of Mannheim
MSc in Political Science, 2014
BA in Political Science, 2011
University of Mannheim
Why is support for income redistribution among the rich higher in some West- ern European welfare states than in others? The argument I propose builds on structural differences in the social insurance design. Flat-rate systems provide so- cial benefits in equal amounts to everyone in need, while earnings-related systems provide benefits in relation to previous earnings. These differences in the configu- ration of the welfare state historically go back to Bismarck and Beveridge and have implications for questions of distributive justice and fairness. If individual incomes have fair and unfair components, earnings-related systems maintain both compo- nents during periods of economic hardship, while flat-rate systems equalize fair and unfair income differences. With a combination of observational and experimental data, I show that average support for redistribution among the better-off is higher in earnings-related systems and participants in a laboratory experiment increase transfer shares in allocation problems which maintain given endowment differences.
Some political economists argue that who the poor are matters for whether the rich support redistribution. I propose that whether and how social identity influences redistribution preferences depends on the fairness ideal that people endorse. I implement a laboratory study which allows for behavioral heterogeneity across fairness types, and for a distinction between preference-based and information-based identity mechanisms. Results suggest that participants adhere to liberal, parochial/luck egalitarian, and welfare maximizing principles of fairness. Only the parochial/luck egalitarian subgroup reveals ingroup favoritism. The evidence supports a preference-based explanation and suggest that information is important for absolute levels of inequality reduction.
Social insurance models prominently argue that selfish demand for future bene- fits explains support for redistribution among the rich. In this article, I posit that social insurance defines the scope of other-regarding preferences. The welfare state provides benefits to insure against individual exposure to labor market risks. Some welfare states provide social safety nets and benefits are provided in equal amounts to everyone, while in others, benefits are related to previous earnings and stabi- lize individual incomes over the life-cycle. These structural differences define the relative impact of labor market risks on individual income, and consequently, the stability of one’s living status over time. I employ simulated unemployment replacement rates to construct a measure for the governing principle of social insurance and show that average support for redistribution is higher in earnings-related systems. Labor market risk has a stronger impact on redistribution preferences in flat-rate systems. Experimental evidence shows that risky endowments influence transfer shares negatively. Previous social insurance approaches have not taken into account the other-regarding perspective.
Why do the rich support income redistribution? In this book project, I first assess the link between welfare state institutions and preferences for redistribution. Second, I study whether people are aware of the mechanics of the welfare state they live in. And third, I evaluate whether people living in different welfare states differ in their perspectives of which system they deem more fair. The book project will provide a novel approach towards people’s redistribution preferences, the nature of the welfare state, and considerations of fairness.