

University of Hamburg
Department of Social and Economic Sciences
Political Science
Dr. Verena Fetscher

24-201.11

Introduction to Comparative Politics and Regional Studies

Fall-Winter 2021, Tuesdays, 12:15-13:45 (online)

Office Hours: Tuesdays, 16:00-17:00 (by appointment)
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Course Outline

The purpose of the lecture is to give MA students a comprehensive overview over the field of comparative political science with some references to regional studies. The focus is on analytical and methodological approaches to conducting research with a comparative focus on political and institutional development.

This module aims to:

1. Provide a rich understanding of the origins, processes, and consequences of political, institutional, and economic developments from a comparative perspective
2. Increase student's interest in rigorous political economic analysis,
3. Discuss the similarities and dissimilarities of economics, politics, and institutions across different countries and different political regimes and systems
4. Provide students with a firm knowledge of major applications and topics in comparative and regional politics,
5. Develop students abilities to conduct rigorous analyses in comparative political science,
6. Enable students to organize their written texts in way that mirrors scholarly work.

The module also enables students to acquire the following generic and transferable skills:

1. Library and Internet research
2. Data collection, presentation, and analysis
3. Exposition and argumentation in a structured fashion
4. Working independently and as part of a group

5. Presenting verbal argument to classroom peers
6. Production of short well-researched essays and reports
7. Structuring and organizing scientific texts.
8. Working to deadlines
9. Conducting oneself in a scholarly and professional manner

Key Skills

On this module students will need, use and improve the following key skills:

- **Systematic thinking:** All theories and explanations in comparative and international political economy make assumptions about important actors, their utility function, and the structure in which social interaction takes place, especially a globalizing economy. The module will improve the student's ability to identify crucial assumptions and discuss how arguments are related to assumptions.
- **Transfer of ideas and arguments:** Students will apply theoretical arguments to issue-areas, in which these theories have not been developed.
- **Improving own learning and performance:** Students will learn how to simplify complicated arguments to the core of the underlying logic.
- **Communication:** Students will use and exercise open-mindedness in oral presentation and discussion.
- **Writing:** Students will write discuss and learn how to organize research, develop arguments, test theories and write scientific texts.
- **Interacting with others:** Students will discuss controversial themes in comparative politics. This requires to respect others, listen carefully, argue calmly but self-confident.

Requirements

Final Exam. Further details discussed during the lecture.

Absences. You are expected to attend every class. Please inform me in advance if you will not be able to attend a session. The class is organized in a cumulative manner, it is necessary for you to catch up with the material in case of missing a session.

Cheating. The University's minimum penalty for plagiarism is to fail the course. Cheating or plagiarism can lead to expulsion (Exmatrikulation) from the University.

Suggestions. Suggestions for improvement are welcome at any time.

Schedule

October 12	Course Organization and Introduction
October 19	Science & Politics
October 26	The Origins of the Modern State & Democracy and Dictatorship
November 2	The Economic and Cultural Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship
November 9	Democratic Transitions
November 16	Democracy or Dictatorship? Does It Make A Difference?
November 23	Varieties of Dictatorship
November 30	Problems with Group Decision Making
December 7	Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies
December 14	Elections and Electoral Systems
December 21	Christmas Break
December 28	Christmas Break
January 4	Social Cleavages and Party Systems
January 11	Institutional Veto Players
January 18	Consequences of Democratic Institutions
January 25	Exam

Readings

William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017)

It is advisable to purchase the book since the library has only a few copies in stock.

1. Course Organization and Introduction

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch.1

2. Science & Politics

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 2, 3

3. The Origins of the Modern State & Democracy and Dictatorship

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 4, 5

Recommended:

- Philip Osafo-Kwaako and James A Robinson, “Political Centralization in Pre-Colonial Africa,” *Journal of Comparative Economics* 41, no. 1 (2013): 6–21
- Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, “On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo,” *Journal of Political Economy* 128, no. 1 (2020): 000–000
- Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics,” *American Economic Review* 99, no. 4 (2009): 1218–44
- Charles Tilly, “Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990,” in *Collective Violence, Contentious Politics, and Social Change* (Routledge, 2017), 140–154
- Peter B Evans, “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State,” vol. 4, 4 (Springer, 1989), 561–587
- Nicola Gennaioli and Ilija Rainer, “The Modern Impact of Precolonial Centralization in Africa,” *Journal of Economic Growth* 12, no. 3 (2007): 185–234
- Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, “Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development,” *Econometrica* 81, no. 1 (2013): 113–152

4. The Economic Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 6

Recommended:

- Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, *Pillars of Prosperity* (Princeton University Press, 2011)
- Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson, *The Emergence of Weak, Despotism and Inclusive States* (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017)
- Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson, “Paths to Inclusive Political Institutions,” in *Economic History of Warfare and State Formation* (Springer, 2016), 3–50
- Daron Acemoglu et al., “The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution,” *American economic review* 101, no. 7 (2011): 3286–3307
- Ethan Bueno De Mesquita, “Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs,” *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 446–466
- Arindrajit Dube, Ethan Kaplan, and Suresh Naidu, “Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information,” *The Quarterly journal of economics* 126, no. 3 (2011): 1375–1409
- Eric Chaney, “Revolt on the Nile: Economic Shocks, Religion, and Political Power,” *Econometrica* 81, no. 5 (2013): 2033–2053
- Diego Puga and Daniel Treffer, “International Trade and Institutional Change: Medieval Venice’s Response to Globalization,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129, no. 2 (2014): 753–821
- Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, “Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution,” *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 3 (2014): 575–603
- Kathleen Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan* (Cambridge University Press, 2004)

5. The Cultural Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 7

Recommended:

- Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, *Pillars of Prosperity* (Princeton University Press, 2011)

- Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson, *The Emergence of Weak, Despotic and Inclusive States* (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017)
- Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson, “Paths to Inclusive Political Institutions,” in *Economic History of Warfare and State Formation* (Springer, 2016), 3–50
- Daron Acemoglu et al., “The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution,” *American economic review* 101, no. 7 (2011): 3286–3307
- Ethan Bueno De Mesquita, “Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs,” *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 446–466
- Arindrajit Dube, Ethan Kaplan, and Suresh Naidu, “Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information,” *The Quarterly journal of economics* 126, no. 3 (2011): 1375–1409
- Eric Chaney, “Revolt on the Nile: Economic Shocks, Religion, and Political Power,” *Econometrica* 81, no. 5 (2013): 2033–2053
- Diego Puga and Daniel Treffer, “International Trade and Institutional Change: Medieval Venice’s Response to Globalization,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129, no. 2 (2014): 753–821
- Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, “Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution,” *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 3 (2014): 575–603
- Kathleen Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan* (Cambridge University Press, 2004)

6. Democratic Transitions & Democracy or Dictatorship? Does It Make A Difference?

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 8, 9

Recommended:

- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” *American Economic Review* 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401
- Melissa Dell, “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita,” *Econometrica* 78, no. 6 (2010): 1863–1903
- Benjamin F Jones and Benjamin A Olken, “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120, no. 3 (2005): 835–864
- Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer, “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” *American economic review* 95, no. 4 (2005): 1190–1213

- Daron Acemoglu, Camilo García-Jimeno, and James A Robinson, “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach,” *American Economic Review* 105, no. 8 (2015): 2364–2409
- Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” *American political science review* 87, no. 3 (1993): 567–576

7. Varieties of Dictatorship

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 10

Recommended:

- Paola Giuliano and Nathan Nunn, *The Transmission of Democracy: From the Village to the Nation-State* (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013)
- Susanne Lohmann, “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91,” *World politics* 47, no. 1 (1994): 42–101
- William Easterly, “Benevolent Autocrats,” *Work. Pap., Dev. Res. Inst., New York Univ., New York*, 2011,
- Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
- Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, *The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics* (PublicAffairs, 2011)
- Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1999)
- Bruce Bueno De Mesquita et al., “Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders,” *British Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 4 (2002): 559–590
- Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change,” *Comparative political studies* 42, no. 2 (2009): 167–197
- Jean-Marie Baland and James A Robinson, “Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile,” *American Economic Review* 98, no. 5 (2008): 1737–65
- Siwan Anderson, Patrick Francois, and Ashok Kotwal, “Clientelism in Indian Villages,” *American Economic Review* 105, no. 6 (2015): 1780–1816
- Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni, “Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States,” *Journal of the European economic association* 9, no. 2 (2011): 177–208

8. Problems with Group Decision Making

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 11

Recommended:

- Stephen Coate and Stephen Morris, “Policy Persistence,” *American Economic Review* 89, no. 5 (1999): 1327–1336
- Scott E Page, “Path Dependence,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1, no. 1 (2006): 87–115
- Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson, “Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions,” *American Economic Review* 98, no. 1 (2008): 267–93
- Daron Acemoglu, James A Robinson, and Ragnar Torvik, “Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?,” *Review of Economic Studies* 80, no. 3 (2013): 845–875

9. Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 12

Recommended:

- Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,” *The quarterly journal of economics* 112, no. 1 (1997): 85–114
- Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo,” *Public choice* 33, no. 4 (1978): 27–43
- Alberto F Alesina and Allan Drazen, “Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?,” 1989,
- Allan Drazen and Vittorio Grilli, “The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms,” *The American Economic Review* 83, no. 3 (1993): 598–607
- Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi, “Who Adjusts and When? The Political Economy of Reforms,” *IMF Staff Papers* 53, no. 1 (2006): 1–29
- Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer, “The Generalized War of Attrition,” *American Economic Review* 89, no. 1 (1999): 175–189
- Allan Drazen, “The Political Economy of Delayed Reform,” *The Journal of Policy Reform* 1, no. 1 (1996): 25–46
- Dani Rodrik, “Understanding Economic Policy Reform,” *Journal of economic Literature* 34, no. 1 (1996): 9–41
- Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi, *The Political Economy of Reform* (Mit Press, 1998)

10. Elections and Electoral Systems

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 13

Recommended:

- Duncan Black, “On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making,” *Journal of political economy* 56, no. 1 (1948): 23–34
- Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Pearson Education (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1957)
- Elisabeth R Gerber and Jeffrey B Lewis, “Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation,” *Journal of Political Economy* 112, no. 6 (2004): 1364–1383
- David S Lee, Enrico Moretti, and Matthew J Butler, “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the US House,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119, no. 3 (2004): 807–859
- Grant Miller, “Women’s Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123, no. 3 (2008): 1287–1327
- Suresh Naidu, *Suffrage, Schooling, and Sorting in the Post-Bellum US South* (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012)
- Timothy J Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, “The Swing Voter’s Curse,” *The American economic review*, 1996, 408–424
- Thomas R Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal, “Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty,” *American political science review* 79, no. 1 (1985): 62–78
- Alan S Gerber and Donald P Green, “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment,” *American political science review* 94, no. 3 (2000): 653–663
- Alan S Gerber, Donald P Green, and Ron Shachar, “Voting May Be Habit-forming: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment,” *American journal of political science* 47, no. 3 (2003): 540–550
- Alan S Gerber, Donald P Green, and Christopher W Larimer, “Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment,” *American political Science review* 102, no. 1 (2008): 33–48
- Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico, “A Drawback of Electoral Competition,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3, no. 6 (2005): 1318–1348
- David W Nickerson, “Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments,” *American political Science review* 102, no. 1 (2008): 49–57

- Marco Battaglini, Rebecca B Morton, and Thomas R Palfrey, “The Swing Voter’s Curse in the Laboratory,” *The Review of Economic Studies* 77, no. 1 (2010): 61–89
- Stephen Coate, Michael Conlin, and Andrea Moro, “The Performance of Pivotal-Voter Models in Small-Scale Elections: Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda,” *Journal of Public Economics* 92, nos. 3-4 (2008): 582–596
- Thomas Fujiwara, “A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger’s Law,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 6, nos. 3-4 (2011): 197–233
- Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo, “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India,” *Econometrica* 72, no. 5 (2004): 1409–1443

11. Social Cleavages and Party Systems

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 14

Recommended:

- Alberto Alesina, “Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters,” *The American Economic Review* 78, no. 4 (1988): 796–805
- Michael Laver, “Models of Government Formation,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 1, no. 1 (1998): 1–25
- David P Baron, “A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems,” *American Political Science Review* 85, no. 1 (1991): 137–164
- James Adams et al., “Understanding Change and Stability in Party Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to Public Opinion or to Past Election Results?,” *British journal of political science* 34, no. 4 (2004): 589–610
- Larry M Bartels, “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 2000, 35–50
- Per Pettersson-Lidbom, “Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 6, no. 5 (2008): 1037–1056
- Kenneth A Shepsle and Barry R Weingast, “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice,” *Public choice* 37, no. 3 (1981): 503–519

12. Institutional Veto Players

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 15

Recommended:

- Pippa Norris, “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems,” *International political science review* 18, no. 3 (1997): 297–312
- Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell, *The Politics of Electoral Systems* (OUP Oxford, 2005)
- Gary W Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems* (Cambridge University Press, 1997)
- R Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler, “A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections,” *British Journal of Political Science* 30, no. 1 (2000): 57–75
- George Tsebelis, “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism,” *British journal of political science* 25, no. 3 (1995): 289–325
- Scott J Basinger and Mark Hallerberg, “Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom,” *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 2 (2004): 261–276
- Philip Keefer and David Stasavage, “The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy,” *American political science review* 97, no. 3 (2003): 407–423
- Edward D Mansfield and Helen V Milner, “Votes, Vetoes, and Preferential Trading Agreements,” *New Era*, 2010,

13. Consequences of Democratic Institutions

Required:

- William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, *Principles of Comparative Politics* (CQ Press, 2017) Ch. 16

Recommended:

- Alberto Alesina, “Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters,” *The American Economic Review* 78, no. 4 (1988): 796–805
- Michael Laver, “Models of Government Formation,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 1, no. 1 (1998): 1–25
- David P Baron, “A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems,” *American Political Science Review* 85, no. 1 (1991): 137–164
- James Adams et al., “Understanding Change and Stability in Party Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to Public Opinion or to Past Election Results?,” *British journal of political science* 34, no. 4 (2004): 589–610

- Larry M Bartels, “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 2000, 35–50
- Per Pettersson-Lidbom, “Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 6, no. 5 (2008): 1037–1056
- Kenneth A Shepsle and Barry R Weingast, “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice,” *Public choice* 37, no. 3 (1981): 503–519

14. Exam